

Robert Schuman Centre

Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy

Defining the
European Security Policy

GUIDO LENZI

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
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ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE

Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy

Defining the European Security Policy

GUIDO LENZI

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These are again times when events tend to unfold faster than the human ability to foresee and steer them. Attempts at fitting them into pre-existing structures may prove elusive and even lead to unexpected drawbacks. Over 50 years ago, Gramsci lamented that the old order had faded while the new one was not yet recognisable. In his Zurich speech of 1946, Churchill called for 'recreating the European fabric.' He was followed, in 1950, by Robert Schuman who, setting the course for European integration, declared that 'world peace cannot be ensured without creative initiatives.' Today, we are once again 'at the creation,' as Dean Acheson then put it, with extensive new challenges and opportunities confronting Europe, from within and outside its borders, in political and economic terms.

Europe's security: from deterrence to cooperation

The wide-open fields of globalisation and of network society compete with the defensive assertion of micro-identities in a relationship of mutual cause and effect. This apparently contradictory mixture of transnational impositions and self-defence reflexes, branded as 'globalism,' has already produced a mutation of the international system - an evolution of the species catalysed by economic diaspora criss-crossing national boundaries at will.¹ 'Global economy, local mayhem' was recently the title of *The Economist*, though it was later added that 'the world economy may be on the brink of its first synchronised growth since the first world war.' From its Olympus, the Davos Economic Forum agreed. And Karl Lamers, writing from Bonn to a French sceptic,² argued that 'polity must be oriented with respect to ...the diktat of supranational reality, namely of global competition; this reality offers no alternative.' The European Monetary Union, when it finally happens, will consecrate the supremacy of economics over politics, and constitute the ultimate vindication of Monnet's vision. Common Foreign and Security Policy cannot lag behind any longer.

Security matters are not immune to this groundswell. These structural changes involve a broader concept of stability and security, and imply a renovated military posture that addresses crisis prevention and management rather than actual war-fighting. Brushing aside the clear-cut equations of bipolarism, too many variables are at play today, which defy the ability of individual states to control them, assuming that they are actually prepared to do so. Unpredictability and instability emerge as the reverse side of the liberalisation and democratisation coin. Any confusion that exists is not about general concepts, but has more to do with the present unwillingness of European states to undertake international commitments after years of being comfortably tucked beneath the strategic cover of the US. Apparently, no

danger (not even Yugoslavia falling bloodily apart!) is perceived as sufficiently imminent to persuade states to do something decisively, either individually or through the available international mechanisms. The fact is that a process of domestic adjustment is under way in every European country, to the East as much as to the West of the former continental divide, which is not conducive to international security endeavours beyond the most elementary call of duty. Humanitarian intervention is the most that Europeans have so far been able to accept, in so-called 'non Art.5' (the former 'out of area') contingencies, leaving the Americans in charge of any peace-enforcement mission. Residual respect for the principle of territorial integrity, combined with a reluctance to get in harm's way, may account for this. The result is that any attempt at a re-appropriation of specific European security responsibilities will be postponed until the tangle has become so intricate as to defy any effective intervention. The establishment of a European security policy therefore requires determination of the kind that was in the end lacking in 1954, when the European Defence Community failed the scrutiny of the French National Assembly. The situation may be much more favourable today than it was then, precisely because all states, big and small, are either unable or unwilling to go it alone in the international security field. The Madrid and Amsterdam summits have provided important indications to that effect, with the convergence of the reform processes undertaken by both NATO and the EU, and WEU positioning itself consequently at their intersection.

In the meantime, however, many national sensitivities, antagonistic trouble-spots, and national stiffnesses have re-emerged from under the Cold War glacier, increasing the potential of possible crises. As Yugoslavia amply demonstrated, addressing them early rather than waiting to contain their consequences in a proactive, rather than reactive, political posture is not only a commonsensical response but is also a way of overcoming the reluctance of states to intervene militarily in conflict management abroad. For the purposes of developing a wider concept of security, even full-fledged military means have been made available for non-military policing tasks. These developments also have blurred many distinctions, complicated the calculations of political analysts, and confounded the electorate. Simplistic traditional solutions are thrown at radically new situations, while any innovative and voluntaristic approach of the kind expressed in Maastricht remains buried under the rubble of the Soviet empire. What is more, for the first time decision makers are confronted with the need to involve the public fully in an extensive debate about national security interests and the most appropriate means of protecting them. While territorial defence is a self-evident constitutional duty, the projection of forces abroad for international solidarity or the promotion of a yet ill-defined international order are not, and therefore arguments to support such measures must be presented convincingly to the electorate. In order to forestall

a 'democratic deficit' in matters of security and defence, a new impetus has been given to multilateral formulas which has produced a renaissance of the universalist concept of a concert of nations, in its constant tug-of-war with the realist balance-of-power kind of approach.

The Wilsonian dream of a new international order, re-enacted at the San Francisco Conference, is therefore surfacing again. And yet, given the diffuse system of multiple polarities and moving targets, the UN cannot be saddled with the utopia of world government. Multilateral contexts must not substitute for nations' responsibilities or be scapegoats for nations' failures. They should constitute instead a tool that Europe has a vital interest in using to avoid sinking again into a national free-for-all and collective irrelevance. This time, Europe itself is at stake. Its Common Foreign and Security Policy ambitions may have been set too high at Maastricht: integration may remain elusive in defence and security matters where state prerogatives are still paramount. But European nations are aware that the challenges before them cannot be dealt with single handedly, and that they cannot continue to sublet their own security to the United States. The parameters of a European security strategy and the organisations to implement it already exist. But they must be rearranged, keeping in mind that no all-purpose solution can be devised, whilst a sense of direction must indicate that the European Community of nations is determined and able to use them, instead of giving in to isolationist or unilateralist tendencies. This adjustment has been termed 'the road back to Carolingia' (or is it simply to the Congress of Vienna?), involving at the same time a deepening of the common resolve and a widening of its solidarity. The two processes have different motivations, but their convergence must eventually lead to a recognisable common institutional framework.

In the meantime, in spite of the many invocations, no world leader is available and no all-purpose core group or other pre-established *directoire* is likely to emerge.³ With no barbarians at the door, these can hardly be heroic times; at best, explorers could venture out to the uncharted territories that ancient maps used to indicate with the inscription 'hic sunt leones' (here dwell lions). The adjustments that are called for, in fact, do not always imply complex institutional engineering. It is managers, rather than architects, that are needed to ensure that the behaviours of states converge. Institutional interlinkages ought to encourage the sharing of responsibilities rather than impose structural hierarchies. Improved world governance needs the contribution of Europe as a distinct international actor. Western Europe, apart from its NATO connection, already exerts a stabilising gravitational and catalytic effect, to the extent that a demand for Europe exists in the new democracies and in the world at large. Things are already happening which politicians are hesitant to recognise and

label accordingly. An impression of improvisation is thus spreading, with the recurring disputes between proponents of positive law and common law pragmatists, who shield from each other the commonalities of their purpose.⁴ No wonder the demand for Europe has been shifted to the back-burner by applicants who now only queue for NATO, as if it were the cure for all ills. Instead, all European governments are increasingly aware that in security matters they will often have to fend for themselves. Even the recognised lone surviving superpower is reluctant and ineffective, although still able to wield its influence globally, aware as it is that the new multilateral conditions reduce its ability to shape events. Even nuclear deterrence is affected by this alteration in the international fabric.

Managers in demand, architects in abundance

No grand design is available for the world, and therefore for Europe, to deal with the transition from the Cold War situation of 'no war, no peace' to a scenario where both war and peace can coexist. Things just happen, out of benign neglect at best. An enlarged security concept has thus emerged, where military and non-military factors interplay, and threats become multifaceted and uncontrollable by using traditional means. No strategic thermostat is applicable. Confronted as we are with such multifaceted and ambiguous challenges, cooperative security has become a matter of participation in a preventive mode, with differentiated interventions tackling separately the various potential crisis factors, a matter of empowerment rather than of imposition. New modalities of cooperation are being devised that overcome the traditional concepts of national sovereignty, and improve interaction where gaps appear in institutional arrangements and intergovernmental agreements. Political mentalities must evolve from the automatisms of traditional security structures that can no longer provide for every conceivable contingency, to a more voluntaristic approach that brings together only the willing and able. Hard cores, and variable speeds and geometries are already at play, regardless of institutional arrangements. They must now be more coherently interconnected. In Europe, the issues of enlargement and institutional reform have so far monopolised attention, as if they could in themselves absorb the variety of conditions, perceptions, and aspirations liberated by the disintegration of the bipolar system. Nowadays, different postures characterise even the full members of Western European institutions. That does not prevent the quite distinct approaches and perspectives of Germany, Sweden, Norway, Estonia, and Poland from cooperating effectively in the Baltic Sea area. Elsewhere, subregional cooperative possibilities have not been fully explored, subordinated as they are to the gold rush towards NATO or EU. Institutional solutions may buttress the

eventual achievements within an overall structural coherence, but they cannot in themselves substitute for the *ad hoc* coalition building that today's multifaceted and ambiguous contingencies call for.

Collective defence cannot extend to every possible scenario. Nor can any alliance possibly establish automatic solidarities with respect to ill-defined scenarios.⁵ In non Art. 5 cooperative security contingencies, regardless of whether they take place in NATO or EU/WEU, decisions will be taken pragmatically, spurred on by events as they unfold and under the leadership of the most resolute and operationally involved.⁶ The broader continental scenario has been repeatedly laid out: in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and all of its offspring, including the Charter of Paris and the Pact on Stability in Europe; in the New Strategic Concept and the Enlargement Study that NATO produced respectively in 1991 and 1995; in the Common Concept of WEU, in 1995; in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of Barcelona, also produced in 1995; all of which, the forthcoming EU Common Foreign and Security Policy will now somehow formally absorb as the political capital of The Fifteen. Compared to other geostrategic regions, Europe is overendowed with political declarations and institutions - the whole spaghetti-junction of them. They must not be rebuilt so much as allowed to interact more accurately, with their respective comparative advantages made more complementary and not exclusive, in a more coherent framework. Consultative and decision-making mechanisms must be readied, apart from any pre-established commitment to crisis management and contingency planning. A shift is occurring, among Europeans and between transatlantic allies, from strategic uniformity to tactical role-sharing, not only in terms of command and control, and logistical adjustments, but also, most importantly, within a broader consultative process extended to global issues, ranging from trade to terrorism. A mixture of multilateral, bilateral, and variable geometry relationships will result, as situations may suggest, tailoring responses to actual needs.

A spaghetti junction of institutions

In order to sustain each and all of these relationships, along with the necessary consensus, legitimacy, credibility, and effectiveness, their functional interlinkage must be improved, steering clear from a strict hierarchical subordination that would diminish the needed flexibility of responses. For the countries already members of European organisations, for those who aspire to membership, for those that will make it soon, and those that will not, a common security denominator will be provided by the interconnection of the existing organisations. The United Nations Charter establishes the legitimising chain, in

a devolution of responsibilities, that include Art.51, which spells out the right of individual and collective self defence, and Chapter VIII, concerning regional cooperation. The Security Council remains the supreme authority in matters concerning the use of force, which can, and increasingly does, approve 'enabling resolutions,' conferring mandates to other organisations or associations of states better suited to addressing specific crises as they arise. In Europe, the following functional chain could ideally apply, which would lead to the re-empowering of Europe on the world scene: the OSCE would generate the necessary overall political consensus, in its capacity as the regional security organisation recognised by the UN Charter; NATO would provide the politico-military transatlantic link that constitutes the essential European common denominator; the Council of Europe would ensure the spreading out and observance of civil rights; the EU would provide the coherence and sense of purpose of an increasingly integrated community, supplemented by a Common Foreign and Security Policy and pillar III's legal and law enforcement provisions; the WEU, finally, would act as the instrument for specifically Western European political-military consultations, planning and eventual operations, involving other countries as needed.

And yet, today the OSCE's overarching context is discarded as ineffective, the EU is confined to a purely economic role, and the WEU is diminished as a needless duplication of NATO. NATO's June 1996 Berlin communique singles out WEU 29 times (and the Madrid Declaration 20 times), but mentions the EU only once in passing, thus confirming Washington's reluctance to utter the two acronyms in the same breath. At a moment when coalition building and variable leadership are needed, NATO enlargement is perceived as the sole institutional remedy for political and operational requirements alike. In present strategic conditions and with dwindling budgets sacrificed to illusory peace dividends, no national Parliament would object to the US preserving and expanding its predominance in European security matters. Why try something new, if a clear-cut distinction can be drawn between the military and economic aspects of Europe, with NATO continuing to take care of the first and the EU addressing the second? Besides, the countries of Central Europe make NATO protection the priority - it is the simple way out compared with the intricate conditionalities of economic integration. But will the new generation of US Congressmen accept these implications? Or should Europe start to organise itself at the lower reaches of the security spectrum, concerning prevention, while keeping in store the decisive transatlantic strategic connection for times of real need? Besides, the two processes of EU and NATO reform are not linear: they must sustain and complement each other, as the new democracies proceed toward a consolidation involving domestic institution building as much as external protection and overall deterrence.

Broad, preventive security does not allow pre-established scenarios and indiscriminate commitments. The pragmatic proactiveness and 'ad-hocery' that circumstances suggest would call instead for diversified responses, tailored to changing needs, and therefore promoting a 'differentiated integration' framework,⁷ within which an undiminished, rather than abstractly undivided, European security could be nurtured. This 'separable, but not separate' concept has already been enshrined in NATO doctrine. In the CFSP provisions, too, this distinction should be allowed: applicant countries could be accepted gradually into the intergovernmental second and third pillar common positions and joint actions, without waiting for the completion of their much stricter structural and economic integration into the first pillar.⁸ This approach would eventually lead to a looser relationship between Art.5 of NATO and WEU,⁹ without detracting from their inherent political and strategic interconnection. It would also ease the development of their respective links with other institutions and towards the prospective applicants for membership.

Without detracting from the specific role that other European organisations would be best suited to perform, the EU is particularly well suited for the 'enlarged security' tasks, not only in its present mostly civilian configuration, but also in its more extensive Maastricht ambitions. The European institutions must however all improve their networking and proactive relationship, to borrow formulas that are applicable to other managerial endeavours. No institutional obsession should be allowed to set in since, as Monnet used to say, 'we are uniting people, not forming coalitions.' Besides, NATO, the EU, WEU, and the OSCE, alongside the UN or the Council of Europe, are all presently acting for what are mainly political purposes, promoting consensus and convergence, national and international compatibilities and interlinkages, an incremental process that must not be allowed to turn into competing cooptations, but lead instead to aggregations and task-sharing.¹⁰ There is life outside and between institutions which can and must disaggregate in order to cope with the variable challenges of European reintegration.

An important development in this direction already occurred in 1991 when, with the 'new strategic concept' approved at its Rome summit, NATO indicated that it was ready to consider responsibilities beyond territorial defence, thus overriding Art.5 implicit geographic constraint, that the US itself had originally established in order to circumscribe its military involvement in Europe. Washington's present reluctance to issue a blank cheque for European security responsibilities in former 'out-of-area' contingencies is therefore conceivably motivated by the conviction that European initiatives not sustained by a credible common political underpinning may erode the credibility of (and

Congressional support for) the transatlantic commitment, equated so far primarily with the US contribution. Instead of seeking American concessions as a matter of principle, the Europeans should first establish the political decision-making procedures and operational mechanisms appropriate for their own 'separable, but not separate' security purposes. Only then will they be able to go and get from NATO the necessary supplementary assets, provided of course that NATO does not decide to deal with the issue itself. The two processes do not need to be interconnected from above, with all the relevant requests and concessions, devolutions of authority and institutional subordinations: they can proceed in parallel and in full view of each other, especially since (as is often overlooked in the heat of the debate) each of the ten full members of WEU is also a member of EU and NATO, which should in itself preclude any disconnection between the three organisations.

The 'combined joint task forces' (CJTF) concept approved at the Berlin Council in June 1996 constitutes a demonstration that NATO itself intends to diversify and choose between different formulas best designed to address hybrid situations. Indeed, not every security contingency ought to be dealt with by the full might of NATO, which may often be excessive, overshoot its target, or prove counterproductive.¹¹ More credible forms of specifically European responses should therefore be prepared. The Berlin Ministerial has singled out the WEU to be entrusted with 'the political control and strategic direction' of any distinct European action that may need the support of the Alliance. Maastricht, with its Art .J 4, had established the basic terms of reference for a European CFSP. The two must now meet.¹² With the implementation of the CJTF provisions, either NATO or European multilateral *ad hoc* task-forces are an alternative to full-fledged NATO intervention. Their 'double-hatting' would be for unforeseeable contingencies, as would any EU/WEU general defence staff or other command arrangement.¹³ WEU would then have the means to assess the feasibility of a European-led military operation, determine whether it should be conducted under WEU leadership or under the leadership of a nation or nations, and advise and coordinate accordingly. Such a supplementary capability cannot be misconstrued as a challenge to transatlantic solidarity.

The fact that five EU Member States are not full members of WEU (former 'neutrals,' non-NATO members, or the special Danish case) should not in itself constitute a stumbling block, since the types of military tasks presently being considered by the Europeans are in the lower spectrum of security contingencies, which do not involve the full multilateral capability that only NATO can for the moment provide. The revised EU treaty presented at the Amsterdam Ministerial incorporates the 'Petersberg' cooperative security tasks.¹⁴ This happened too late for the EU-WEU relationship to be tested in

Albania, but new opportunities will no doubt soon come up. A joint endeavour has been undertaken when WEU contributed to the organisation of the EU administrative mission in Mostar, with specific policing tasks, the result of which cannot be considered conclusive. The implementation of the Dayton civilian annexes, alongside the SFOR follow-up mission in Bosnia should provide ample opportunities to enhance EU/WEU operational visibility in the field. Clearer multilateral decision-making procedures linking EU and WEU in foreign policy and security matters are, however, indispensable in supplementing, with the appropriate political credibility, the economic gravitational force of the EU as well as of the individual European governments.

If WEU is already fully equipped and legitimised to take upon itself a range of military tasks,¹⁵ its political credibility and, consequently, its operational efficiency still depends on the interlinkage EU and NATO. It is in fact at the intersection of the respective reform curves that WEU will eventually position itself. The deepening and enlargement processes of the two organisations are therefore the necessary preconditions for WEU to derive either a new lease on life or to be grafted in the other institutional structures. So far it has had to stand still in practical terms, but WEU has however prepared generic plans for future contingencies. A WEU paper on 'criteria and modalities for the effective use of CJTF' was produced in June 1994 for NATO to consider; and six 'WEU illustrative missions' (on conflict prevention including monitoring, protection of humanitarian corridors, enforcement of sanctions and embargoes, containment, and interposition missions) were forwarded to NATO in 1996, as well as a more detailed document on 'practical arrangements for evacuation operations.' So far, WEU has been preparing particularly for the monitoring of sanctions, for the assistance in peacekeeping in Africa,¹⁶ and for de-mining operations.

Short of institutional integration with the EU, which the Maastricht process preserves as a possibility, and assuming that an operational requirement is presented to it (by the EU or NATO, but also by the UN or the OSCE), WEU has declared its readiness and willingness to proceed. Its ability to deal with the incremental possibilities of the Petersberg spectrum would of course need to be gradually tested, for purposes of operational effectiveness as well as political credibility. The decision making would occur in the Council, which has appropriately included, since 1984, both Foreign and Defence Ministers. The Planning Cell, Situation Centre and Intelligence Unit, supported by the Satellite Centre, would provide the necessary feasibility assessments and possible force-packaging, drawing on the forces put at their disposal (FAWEUs, including the Eurocorps, Eurofor, Euromarfor and other joint contingents pre-organised by

some, not all, members) or on the CJTF provisions of NATO.

With respect to the interrelationship between EU and WEU, short of a full merger, two intermediate options were presented in 1995 by a WEU Reflection Group to the IGC: either a reinforced partnership preserving the autonomy of each, or a gradual convergence implying political or legal subordination of WEU to EU. Article J4.1 of the 1991 Treaty on European Union established that the CFSP 'shall include all questions related to the common security of the union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in turn lead to a common defence.' The new Treaty modified that phrase to read 'including the progressive framing of a common defence policy... which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide' (emphasis added). This represents a hesitant step back, relying on a Darwinian evolution of the second pillar which diminishes the significance of the practical EU-WEU interlinkage, the provisions of which seem to have also regressed: the Amsterdam Council replaced the terms 'requests the WEU' with 'will avail itself of the WEU' (to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union). Events will, however, press ahead upsetting the ideal Maastricht flow-chart, as the three phases may develop separately and in parallel: common security actions could be undertaken before a common defence policy, let alone a comprehensive CFSP, have been worked out fully.¹⁷ No abstract conclusion can be drawn until sufficient experience and evidence has been built up to sustain the practicability of a more decisive WEU course of action. Pragmatism and feasibility will show some of the possible substance of things to come, but the final purpose, the *acquis* and the common commitment must be progressively reinforced, lest the external credibility of the whole process be greatly undermined, as well as that of the individual nations partaking in it.¹⁸

Coping with an enlarged security space

Deepening aspects are important, but widening aspects are even more crucial. As for the enlargement process, it must be underlined that, while common defence remains necessary for the prospective newcomers and belongs in the realm of NATO and WEU deepening commitments, it is cooperative security that is the most immediate issue of enlargement, in territorial and functional terms. Cooperative security relies on ad hoc, precisely tailored participation. In effect, it can be argued that applicants seek the enlargement of existing institutions more for reasons of political solidarity than for military interoperability. It is widely accepted that forward deployment of NATO will not be necessary, as much as the establishment of interoperability and rapid

reinforcement capabilities. By the same token, EU enlargement is expected to provide political reassurance and practical cooperation in the second (CFSP) and third (law and order) pillars, before the more demanding first pillar conditionalities are met. The expansion of EU will therefore be much more gradual and intricate than NATO's, but it will have far wider socio-economic implications. WEU has in the meantime surged forward, developing a comprehensive and multilateral process of conceptual exchanges, political consultation and some operational cooperation between the more than 30 countries of Europe and the Mediterranean, a process that has somewhat blunted the military alliance implications of the Brussels Treaty.¹⁹ The issue of a 'European security space' must now be addressed by NATO, EU, and WEU in complementary fashion, responding to events as they actually unfold and not in mechanical, separate, and self-contained ways which could result in developments steering clear of real events. The result should not lead to abstract uniformity but rather to the diversification of tasks, the asymmetry of responsibilities and the flexibility of actual commitments that circumstances may demand. Common principles are more than ever indispensable; they admit however differentiated undertakings.

The review process of the TEU has not produced a straightforward insertion of national security policies into the second pillar, which most of the unpredictable international circumstances (apart from the sovereign prerogatives of states) would not warrant. Amsterdam, however, called for a more coherent political expression of common interests and priorities, structural linkages, and a clearer political solidarity. The EU Council had been entrusted with defining principles and general guidelines, as well as with deciding on common strategies (setting out objectives, duration, and means), which would lead - as required - to common positions (defining approach) and joint actions (addressing specific situations where operational action is deemed to be required). Against this backdrop, common operational decisions may be taken pragmatically, possibly involving only some of the member countries and even non members, on an *ad hoc* basis. EU will propose and stimulate; WEU will prepare and eventually coordinate; governments and events will decide the course of action. In non-Art.5 contingencies, where flexibility and multilateral approaches are called for, no pre-established commitments can apply. Nor have institutionalised *directoires* or even permanent 'contact groups' proven possible.²⁰ Furthermore, no institutional primacy can assert itself (with the sole exception of the UN Security Council), nor can formal delegations of authority be sought or attributed as a precondition for action.²¹ The basic principle that would apply is the opting-in of the willing, instead of the opting-out of the unwilling: it is in this sense that the concept of 'constructive abstention' should be formed, together with the political solidarity clause that

will result from it, implicitly or explicitly. The decision-making mechanism would thus remain intergovernmental, and individual national sovereignties would be safeguarded. The 'enhanced cooperations' repeatedly invoked by Bonn and Paris²² would reconcile the deepening and enlarging processes. They would provide the flexibility clause necessary to circumvent unanimities hardly practicable in security issues that cannot be subjected to supranational enforcement. It is worth mentioning that such an escape clause from institutional uniformity is allowed by Art. J 7.4.²³ Its inclusion in Treaty provisions would provide a broader political solidarity underpinning any practicable variable geometry. Inside the European project cooperative security is not simply a matter of belonging, but of participating in the work in progress, or sometimes stepping aside from projects that do not require the compulsory participation of all and cannot allow obstruction from Member States whenever they have no vital interests at stake in the issue at hand.

An essential element of any European security framework must of course be the involvement of Russia as an active participant in the common endeavour, with no privileged status, no veto power or *droit de regard*, and therefore no re-establishment of the bipolar tutorship on European matters, which in these circumstances no longer warrant. Moscow insists that any form of NATO 'expansion' must be 'militarily neutral,' and not involve any forward deployment of nuclear or other significant military hardware. Only Washington could nudge the Kremlin forward towards a more proactive relationship with its other European partners. But, after years of superpower pre-eminence, the United States seems equally unwilling to stoop to conquer, as it could if it would engage in deeper consultations with the Europeans, either in NATO or in OSCE.²⁴ While retaining its function of independent common denominator in any European equation, Washington could play the more open role of facilitator and coalition builder, and thus make the difference in any decision-making forum. If the NATO and EU reform processes do not proceed in full view of each other, their mid-1997 *rendez-vous* may well become a pile-up of disparate initiatives instead of initiating the intended cross-breeding effects. In the meantime, WEU remains on hold: if all goes well, it would naturally find its place as the interface - maybe the intermediary peg - between NATO and the EU, and not the third party interfering with both, which many observers implicitly accuse it of being.

Capping it all, of course, the overriding requirement remains that of maintaining the indispensable linkage with public opinion through parliamentary process. Democratic involvement is particularly necessary in matters of cooperative security, where the prerogatives of the executive must be constantly sustained by a well-informed and involved public that must be

properly fed with persuasive information, especially since the resulting solutions will be subjected to ratification processes and referendums.

The new security agenda for the Union

The 'new security agenda' is basically about stability and predictability in the transitional and evolutionary process affecting every nation, irrespective of whether or not it is a full member of security institutions. Common defence automaticities have been overtaken by flexible cooperative security arrangements, which take into consideration a much broader concept than simply territorial defence. The clear-cut Cold War strategic environment with which NATO was designed to cope, implied homogeneity of military postures and nuclear deterrence. The response to the heterogeneous - and at times ambiguous - new challenges is now more about participation, diversification, and persuasion.

The 'demand for Europe' is two-fold: it is about reintegration after years of forced partition; it is also about participation into a brave new world. The issue lies between the terms of reference that former President Giscard d'Estaing called 'Europe espace' and 'Europe puissance.' When power is sought, the knee-jerk reaction is towards the United States and NATO, the admission to which is the obvious quick-fix solution. Accession to the EU has far broader socio-economic consequences, the pinch of which is felt even by those who already belong to it. And yet, a European security and defence policy within the CFSP has become an ever-increasing requirement, especially after the 'first wave' of NATO enlargement. By developing a political visibility and a preventive security capability, the EU will also stimulate a participatory multilateralism, involving common interests more than common values, operating in and around existing security institutions and blurring the difference between the ins and the outs, thereby integrating a stabilisation process far more complex than military options could ever afford. The issue of whether WEU will eventually integrate the EU and become its security arm should not stall its function as a complementary instrument for the most appropriate downsizing and restructuring of either NATO or EU, in the many, not always foreseeable, circumstances that will be assessed on their own case-by-case merits.

The issue of security, stability, and crisis prevention on a continental European scale cannot only be a matter of belonging or not to the existing organisations. It should instead pursue the convergence, compatibility, and complementarity of different national contributions. Institutions ought to provide a legitimising and organising factor, underpinning what has been

achieved and providing it with greater coherence and political visibility, not project abstract solidarities or replace national responsibilities. An incremental process can accommodate diversity and respect specificities, while promoting the common wealth of behavioural principles established in the OSCE. It is pragmatism and flexibility rather than institutional uniformity that will be needed. In an international situation where challenges and risks are diverse and multifaceted, security reassurances can be provided by interrelating the existing institutions, so that even the nations that lag behind in the process of reform can implicitly benefit from it. A European security space already exists that blurs the difference between the institutional haves and have-nots.²⁵ Pan-European security cannot be bestowed or imposed from above: it must be built from the bottom up by interlinkage and interaction of organisations and national efforts. Core countries and variable geometries, opt-in formulas and *ad hoc* multinational forces composed of the willing and able, whether or not they are members of existing institutions, will best contribute to the overriding requirement of an undiminished security on the continental scale. Producing their CFSP for the benefit of the whole continent should be the special concern of West Europeans.

Notes:

¹ François Sauzay (European Press Officer of the Trilateral Commission), *Anti-Prince* (Rome 1996).

² 'Non Monsieur Seguin, il n'y a pas d'autre politique,' *Le Monde* (12 October 1996).

³ Pierre Lellouche in 'Légitime défense,' Paris 1995, calls for the establishment of a European Security Council within the OSCE, which Russia however has not as forcefully promoted as it was expected to do in the organisation's last ministerial meeting, in November 1996 in Lisbon.

⁴ In spite of their declared different attitudes to greater European integration, France and Britain came together in the Rapid Reaction force in Bosnia, after UNPROFOR, that made IFOR possible.

⁵ Nicole Gnesotto's 'Lessons of Yugoslavia,' *Chaillot Papers* (March 1994).

⁶ Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Will and Paul Kennedy invoke 'Pivotal States,' *Foreign Affairs* (1996/1); Joseph Nye, in his *Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990) spoke of a co-opting power.

⁷ Joseph Janning and Werner Weidenfeld, *Politique Etrangère* 3 (1996).

⁸ An Italo-British proposal along these lines was presented in 1994.

⁹ Institutionally, the connection is established by art. IV of the Brussels Modified Treaty which states that the two organisations shall 'cooperate closely,' in order to 'avoid any duplication'; subsequent political interpretations have imposed a stricter relationship.

¹⁰ The German Foreign Minister Kinkel in *International Herald Tribune* (24-25 December 1996) called for 'a coherent division of labour,' among 'radically reformed multilateral organisations.'

¹¹ Alyson Bailes, 'Europe Defence Challenge,' *Foreign Affairs* 1 (1997) Europeans 'also want to be free to take their own risks with smaller or more offbeat missions that are uncongenial for the US or perhaps too delicate for the heavy hand of NATO.'

¹² The French Foreign Minister put it in the following terms to the members of the WEU Assembly on 3 December 1996: 'WEU is a hinge between the Alliance and the Union: from the former it must extract its full operational dimension; from the latter, its political legitimacy.'

¹³ Some operational NATO/WEU task-sharing has already been tried with the 'Sharp Guard' mission for the enforcement of UN sanctions against Serbia in the Adriatic, a marine environment which lends itself best to multilateral security cooperation (with the exception of AFSOUTH, which has very special politico-military connotations).

¹⁴ Adopted at the June 1992 WEU ministerial, they include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and crisis management, including peace-making, tasks.

¹⁵ Even before the Yugoslav crisis, in 1988, during the Iraq-Iran war, WEU had undertaken a de-mining operation of the Persian Gulf sea-lanes, that went largely unnoticed, for want of appropriate political solidarity; then, on the Danube, WEU cooperated with the riparian countries, for the implementation of the embargo on Serbia.

¹⁶ In conjunction with the Organisation for African Unity or in support of the UN, as was attempted in the Great Lakes crisis.

¹⁷ See also the 1995 joint study of the WEU Institute and the European Strategy Group 'Towards a Common Defence Policy.'

¹⁸ The former French Prime Minister Juppé put it in the following terms: 'Let's have the courage to say it, the Union of tomorrow will no doubt be constituted by two different levels: a Union of common law, comprising the fifteen present members as well as those that have a vocation to adhere to it; at the heart of this Union, of this first circle, a second circle, narrower but modular, composed of a smaller number of States around France and Germany, nations at the same time willing and able to go further or faster than the others on issues such as money or defence' (Translated from *Le Monde* [14 March 1996]). And the 'strategic concept' agreed by France and Germany on 9 Dec. 1996 has also been set 'at the centre of a solidarity framework.'

¹⁹ Christopher Hill of the London School of Economics draws the distinction between 'action organisations' and 'framework organisations,' and raises the possibility that NATO itself may change to the point where it performs both functions separately (the concept was expressed in part during his intervention at the WEU Institute annual seminar for policy planners on 23 January 1997).

²⁰ As the separate Franco-German and Franco-British initiatives in security matters have so far demonstrated.

²¹ In the CJTF concept, WEU would ask for assets, not necessarily for authorisation; but the problem of a possible 'mission creep' would subsist.

²² The de Charette-Kinkel letter of 17 October 1996 spells out the concept, specifying that they should develop 'within the single constitutional context of the Union.' Such a differentiated integration should not jeopardise common policies or marginalise any country. An Italian draft proposal presented on 20 January 1997 along the same lines is intended to stress that the reinforcement of the security of the Union and its member States should be implemented 'at different levels of intensity.' The Franco-German bi-lateral strategic concept of December 1996 spells it out in terms that are far more innovative for Bonn than for Paris.

²³ 'The provisions of this article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more member states on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does run counter to, or impede that provided for in this Title.'

²⁴ Ronald Asmus and Stephen Larrabee, 'NATO and the Have-Nots,' *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1996).

²⁵ The European Security Space working papers by the European Strategy Group and the WEU Institute, 1996. See also Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).



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